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We analyze the relation between inequality, corruption and competition in a developing 
economy context where markets are imperfect. We consider an economy where 
different types of households (efficient and inefficient) choose to undertake production 
activities. For production, households borrow capital from the credit market. They also 
incur non-input costs which they could avoid by bribing inspectors. Due to information 
asymmetry and wealth inequality, the credit market fails to screen out the inefficient 
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implications. We show that a rise in inequality can lead to an increase in corruption 
along with greater competition. 
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Corruption has received a lot of attention from various quarters ￿ espe-
cially in the context of developing economies.1 These economies are typi-
cally characterized by inequality, poverty, government controls and market
imperfections in varying degrees. Our objective in this paper is to examine
the link between corruption and wealth inequality in a liberalized economy
with imperfect markets.
In non-market settings like government provisioning of goods and ser-
vices through public o¢ cials or issuing of licenses and permits for economic
activities, corruption by allowing for more opportunities to some, can ad-
versely impact the wealth constrained section of the society. Empirical
evidence (Gupta et al. 2002, Li et al. 2000) have shown that corruption
does have substantial e⁄ects on the level and distribution of income. The
poor, unable to meet demands for bribe payments, are denied access to var-
ious public services and employment opportunities (Narayan et al. 2000).
Similarly, if entrepreneurial activities require licenses issued by bribe seek-
ing o¢ cials, the wealth constrained entrepreneurs might be left out of the
production sector. This suggests that as economies move towards liberal-
ized market regimes the link between corruption and wealth inequality, as
described above, should weaken. Contrary to this, our analysis shows that,
in such a setting, wealth inequality may itself acts as a catalyst for corrup-
tion, and wealth constrained individuals continue to be adversely a⁄ected
by corruption through the market outcome.
Recent empirical evidence indeed con￿rms that increased inequality can
lead to higher corruption. Using an instrumental variable approach on a
sample of 125 countries and controlling for factors such as democracy, legal
origins and endogeneity issues, You and Khagram (2005) ￿nds strong links
1The World Bank (2005) puts corruption as the ￿ single biggest obstacle to economic
and social development￿ .
1from inequality to corruption. One drawback of their empirical analysis,
however, is the use of perception based measure of corruption. Although
direct data on corruption are rare, the World Bank (1999) Business Envi-
ronment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) data contains such
information on ￿rms of transition countries. In a simple empirical exercise
(described later) using this data, and controlling for factors such as GDP
per capita and number of ￿rms, we ￿nd that inequality has a signi￿cant and
positive impact on corruption.
A plausible reason put forward to explain this is that in a highly unequal
society the rich will engage in corruption (or some other form of subversion
of institutions) to maintain their privileged positions (Glaeser et al. 2003,
Do 2004). But as Hellman and Kaufman (2002) point out, this explanation
is more about the ￿ inequality of in￿ uence￿rather than wealth inequality per
se. Further, corruption may not be the only type of subversive activity
that the rich may undertake. Therefore, presumably, anyone with in￿ uence
will be able to exploit weak institutions to expropriate more wealth. Then
explaining the link from inequality to corruption using the above reasoning
becomes ambiguous. To avoid such ambiguity, we explicitly bring in the role
of wealth inequality and show that, in presence of other imperfections, it can
lead to corruption. This direct link from wealth inequality to corruption,
to the best of our knowledge, has not been established before.
For our model we have an economy characterized by free entry, where
households (potential ￿rms), di⁄erentiated both in terms of e¢ ciency (in-
trinsic pro￿tability) and wealth, may choose to undertake (entrepreneurial)
production activities. For production, households need to borrow capital
from the credit market. Additionally they incur some legal cost of business
(such as taxes and costs of meeting standards and quality control) which
could be avoided by bribing inspectors. In our framework, households (or
￿rms) di⁄er in terms of their bene￿ts from corruption and only the ine¢ -
2cient (low pro￿tability) end up paying bribes for various illegal activities.2
The presence of these bribe paying ine¢ cient types in the market a⁄ect the
pro￿tability of the e¢ cient wealth constrained households. We show that
in the presence of imperfection in the credit market, increase in wealth in-
equality facilitates the entry of ine¢ cient ￿rms, which also are the ones that
engage in corruption. Increased wealth inequality then leads to increased
corruption.
In our model poor entrepreneurs are unconstrained in terms of bribe
paying ability and they can bene￿t as much as the rich entrepreneurs through
bribing. Therefore the direct role of inequality in engendering corruption
may be limited. However, using a multi-market framework, we show that
inequality can a⁄ect corruption indirectly through channels in other markets.
Hence, the multi-market framework becomes important. This aspect also
has so far not been analysed in the literature.
Since, in our model, corruption can facilitate entry of the ine¢ cient
￿rms, it is not surprising that we ￿nd greater corruption coexists with a
larger number of ￿rms entering the market. Therefore, while capturing the
link between inequality and corruption, we also shed light on how corruption
and competition may coexist. Although it is widely held that competition
lowers corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Ades and di Tella, 1999; World
Bank, 1997),3 experience of transition and other developing countries reveal
that despite embracing considerable deregulation and liberalization to in-
crease competition, corruption is on the rise (Leiken 1996-97, Kaufman and
Siegelbaum 1997). We argue that changes in the underlying distribution of
wealth may o⁄er a plausible reason for such occurrence.4
2This is opposite to the view that ￿rms hide and engage in illegal activities because
they are subject to extortion, see Shleifer (1997). But as Johnson et al. (1999) rightly
point out, it is not possible to ascertain whether ￿rms pay bribes because they hide or
they hide becasue they are subject to extortion.
3Recently, however, this view has come under further scrutiny (La⁄ont and N￿ Guessan,
1999).
4Other reasons, put forward in the literature include institutional features and policy
3In this context it is important to bear the nature of corruption in mind.
Most of the literature adopt what we call a ￿ victimization￿ approach ￿
agents pay bribes because of extortionary demand by the public o¢ cials.5
Bribe paying agents are not viewed as the real bene￿ciaries. Corruption,
viewed this way always reduces pro￿tability. We do not deny this but we
argue that the extortion view does not explain the whole picture. Corrup-
tion in the sense of collusion between o¢ cials and agents can be bene￿cial
to the agents too. According to Hellman, Jones and Kaufman (2000) one of
the main aspects of corruption in transition countries is the ￿ phenomenon of
￿state capture￿by the corporate sector￿ . What it shows is that corruption
also involves collusion between the government and private agents although
agents may di⁄er in terms of their bene￿ts from corruption. This feature
of corruption is key to the present paper.
To summarize, our paper di⁄ers from the literature in three main aspects.
First, our paper provides a plausible explanation of how inequality may en-
gender corruption. The few papers (Gupta et. al 2002, Li et. al. 2000)
which discuss inequality in the context of corruption mainly look at how
corruption leads to more inequality empirically.6 Second, the paper uses a
multi-market framework to explore the link between corruption, competition
and wealth inequality. In the literature,7 corruption is studied mainly in the
context of problems in that particular market, be it informational asymme-
tries or incentive structure. While we do not doubt the merit of this, we
feel that it is important to see if this problem is related to imperfections in
other related markets. Here, our focus is on the link between corruption in
failures to implement proper derugulation (Kaufman 1997, Shelifer 1997).
5Most of the leading models such as. Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Bliss and di Tella
(1997) and the recent ￿rm level studies (Svensson 2003), follow the extortion view. This
is not true for the agency based models of corruption such as. Besley and McLaren (1993),
Mookherjee and Png (1995), La⁄ont and N￿ Guessan (1999).
6As mentioned earlier, You and Khagram (2005) empirically examine the e⁄ect of
inequality on corruption. In di⁄erent contexts, Banerjee (1997) and Do (2004) also study
the e⁄ects of inequality on corruption.
7See Bardhan (1997), Andvig and Fjeldstad (2001) for recent surveys on corruption.
4the product market and wealth inequality and imperfections in the credit
market. We argue that they reinforce each other and it may not be su¢ cient
to look at corruption alone. Third, the collusion-view of corruption gen-
erates di⁄erent implications compared to the extortion-view of corruption.
We feel that both features are important to our understanding of corruption
in developing economies.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the remainder of this section
we provide a few empirical observations to highlight the link between cor-
ruption, competition and inequality. In the next section we ￿rst provide
a brief description and intuition of the basic model. We then describe the
characteristics of the di⁄erent agents and how they interact strategically
in our model. Section 3 contains the results and analysis under di⁄erent
scenarios. We consider the complete information case and the incomplete
information case with wealth constraints arising from inequality. Lastly,
section 4 concludes with a few brief remarks and some directions for future
research
1.1 Some Empirical Observations
The purpose of this simple empirical exercise is mainly to motivate our the-
oretical model better. For 26 transition countries, BEEPS provides the
percentage of ￿rms engaged in corruption.8 The ￿rms have been asked
speci￿c questions about the frequency and the reasons for engaging in cor-
ruption such as whether it was for tax purposes, for the provision of public
services etc. We take the proportion of ￿rms engaged in corruption for tax
purposes as a measure of corruption. The BEEPS survey made consistent
e⁄orts to select a representative sample of ￿rms from each country (Hellman
et al. 2000). We take the number of ￿rms surveyed in each of these coun-
8For our analysis we have used 23 countries. Three countries (Albania, Bosnia and
Republic of Serpska) have been dropped because reliable Gini indices for these countries
were unavailable.
5tries as an indicator for the total number of ￿rms in each country and hence
an indicator of the level of competition, though in our theoretical model we
include some deeper parameters of competition (see Bliss and di Tella 1997).
Since data on wealth inequality are extremely rare, lagged Gini index for
income or consumption inequality have been used as proxy; the intuition
being that previous years income or consumption inequality will re￿ ect on
the current periods wealth inequality through savings and investments. We
have used the most recent available Gini index (of the past years) from the
Human Development Reports (UNDP 2002, 2003)and the WIDER (2004)
WIID data set on inequality for these countries for 1999. Further, to get a
broader picture, we have also considered how GDP per capita9 is interlinked
with corruption, inequality and competition.
Table 1a in the Appendix provides the summary statistics and Table 1b
shows the correlation matrix of our variables of interest. The full data is
presented in Table 3. We ￿nd that (a) GDP per capita and corruption
are negatively correlated (correlation coe¢ cient -0.76) and it is signi￿cant;
(b) the level of wealth inequality (indicated by the lagged gini index for
income inequality) is positively and signi￿cantly correlated with corruption
(correlation coe¢ cient is 0.70); (c) the level of competition (indicated by the
number of ￿rms) does not seem to be correlated with corruption.
Taking this further in Table 2, we use three separate logit models to test
the link between corruption, competition and inequality. Our dependent
variable is the log of the ratio of corrupt ￿rms to non-corrupt ￿rms, which
we call the log of the odds ratio. Model 1 regresses the number of ￿rms
and the GDP per capita on the log of the odds ratio. Model 2 includes the
gini index instead of the GDP per capita. The last speci￿cation regresses
all the three variables together on the log of the odds ratio.
In all the three models in Table 2 that the e⁄ect of competition on cor-
9The GDP data per capita is from the World Development Indicators website at
http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/
6ruption is statistically insigni￿cant. It validates the point that increase in
number of ￿rms may not necessarily lead to a decrease in corruption. This
does not rule out, however, that for some countries competition may indeed
decrease corruption. On the other hand, there may be countries where com-
petition leads to increased corruption. We understand that the relationship
between competition and corruption is a complex one and our empirical
model may be too simplistic. One, however, can still use this observation
to make the point that the link between competition and corruption is quite
ambiguous.
In line with more rigorous empirical studies (Treisman 2000, Mauro 1995)
we ￿nd a strong negative relation between GDP per capita and corruption.
However, Table 2 also indicates that as inequality increases the number of
corrupt ￿rms relative to non corrupt ￿rms will increase. This is valid for
both models 1 and 2. This aspect, where increased inequality leads to more
corruption, has not been analyzed rigorously before and it will be one of
our goals in this paper to provide an analytical explanation for the observed
link from inequality to corruption. Although informational problems also
play an important role in our analysis, we have not been able to take that
explicitly, for most transition countries, however, such market imperfections
remain pervasive (Svenjar, 2002; Berglof and Bolton, 2002).
2 The Model
2.1 A Summary
In our model, households10 are basically classi￿ed in to two types: good
(with high probability of success) and bad (with low probability of success).
Given non-convexity in the production process all households must borrow
a certain amount say, K. Households staying out of the production sector
10We shall be using both terms ￿ households￿and ￿ ￿rms￿ . Households in the production
sector will be referred to as ￿rms.
7do not need to borrow, and receive some ￿xed outside income. Firms also
incur non-input costs of running a legal business. Inspectors are supposed
to ensure compliance by the ￿rms, but they can collude with the ￿rm and
avoid reporting.
The focus is on two levels of interactions. One takes place in the credit
market between the ￿rm and the bank, and the other takes place in the
product market between the ￿rm and the inspector. A particular house-
hold￿ s expected payo⁄ from undertaking production depends on its type
and the outcome of these two interactions. The ￿rst interaction referred to
as the credit game determines the cost of capital and the second determines
the e⁄ective non-input costs or payment.
Corruption facilitates the entry of the ine¢ cient ￿rms by raising the
expected payo⁄. Households can calculate their expected payo⁄after taking
into account the fact that they can bribe the inspector and save on the
costs.11 Hence some households who would not have entered the production
sector in the absence of corruption would ￿nd it pro￿table to do so in the
presence of corruption. The extent of corruption, however, depends on the
outcome in the credit market. If the di⁄erent types are completely screened
in the credit market then it is di¢ cult to sustain corruption because the
e¢ cient high pro￿table ￿rms are less likely to engage in concealment and
corruption where as the corruption-prone ￿rms are likely to exit the market.
As is well known, under certain conditions these types can be separated even
when there is informational asymmetry. This is where wealth inequality
comes in to play. Because some households are wealth constrained, it is
not possible to separate the di⁄erent types completely. That means some
good types get pooled with the bad types. This raises the cost of capital
for these good types and lowers the cost of capital for the bad types. Both
these factors contribute to a rise in the number of the bad types and fall in
11This is somewhat similar to the distortionary e⁄ect of corruption on occupational
choice or technology choice in Acemoglu and Verdier (1998).
8the number of the good ￿rms.
We have three di⁄erent agents who act in a strategic fashion: (a) house-
holds, (b) banks and (c) inspectors. We describe the characteristics of each
agent below.
2.2 Inspectors
Inspectors are in charge of monitoring compliance by the ￿rms. As we shall
discuss later, ￿rms have to incur various types of costs in running a legitimate
business but they can choose to avoid these. These costs include various
types of taxes, costs of meeting quality and other regulatory standards. A
￿rm faces a ￿ne, F, if its non-compliance is reported. However, inspectors
are corruptible and can collude with the ￿rm in exchange for a bribe. We
assume the corruptible inspectors constitute a certain fraction q of the total
population of inspectors.12 Hence, q stands for the corruption environment
describing the scope of corruption or corruptibility of the system.
2.3 The Banks
The banks (B) borrow funds from the public at a ￿xed interest factor r0,
and extend loans of ￿xed amount K to the ￿rms. Project returns are
stochastic. Let ￿i be the probability of success in a project undertaken by
type-i household. Let ri be the interest factor paid and wi be the amount
of collateral pledged. Various types of assets, which constitute household￿ s
wealth, can serve as collateral. We assume that the bank incurs a cost, ￿,
associated with having a collateral. If the bank can observe the types of
borrowers then for each type the bank chooses fri;wig such that the bank
maximizes
￿i
B = ￿i:ri:K + (1 ￿ ￿i):￿:wi ￿ ￿0; (1)
12We do not model the anti-corruption measures, hence q is taken as given. However,
this can be done without a⁄ecting the main qualitative results.
9where ￿ < 1 shows the cost the banks face in keeping a collateral and
￿0 = K:r0. In case the bank cannot observe the di⁄erent types of borrowers,





B ￿ ￿0: (2)
We assume there is perfect competition in the banking sector, so that
the above condition is always satis￿ed with equality. We shall call it the
zero-pro￿t condition.
2.4 The Households
Households can either join the production sector (￿rms) or engage in some
outside option. They di⁄er in terms of the payo⁄from their outside option.
As mentioned earlier, when it comes to production, there are two dif-
ferent types of households, (i) households with good projects (g) and (ii)
households with bad projects (b). The good projects have a higher proba-
bility of success, that is, ￿g > ￿b. Each project yields Y in the successful
state and zero in the failure state.13 We shall argue in the next section that
￿i can also be interpreted as the degree of competitiveness. In a highly
competitive environment, the ine¢ cient ￿rms are unlikely to succeed and ￿b
is likely to be very small.
Households also di⁄er in terms of their initial wealth. We assume that
some households have no wealth. These wealth constrained households
can have good or bad projects, but to simplify the analysis we assume that
these wealth constrained households have only good projects and denote this
group as p. So e⁄ectively we have three groups, the rich households with
good projects (g), the poor households with good projects (p) and the rich
households with the bad projects (b). For convenience, at times we shall
13It is possible to consider the case where output or pro￿t in the successful state di⁄ers
across the types, but it does not a⁄ect our results.
10be referring to the fraction of p-households relative to g-households as the
level of inequality.
In addition to the standard input costs, households (￿rms) engaged in
production have to incur various costs in running a legitimate business.
Some of these would depend on their output or pro￿t and some are ￿xed in
nature. In many developing economies, these would take the form of costs
of compliance with various regulatory standards, quality control, safety and
labour laws. We assume that ￿rms can avoid these costs. For example,
￿rms can choose to disregard pollution control, use substandard inputs,
substitute adult labour with child labour. In addition to all these, ￿rms
can of course hide output and sales to save on various sales taxes and pro￿t
tax. In economies with high levels of compliance, ￿rms do not have so much
of a choice and hence no strategic importance can be attached. However,
these play an important role in our model. All these non-production costs
of legitimate business will be denoted by T. While some components are
likely to be incurred after output is realized, we assume that ￿rms have to
invest T before the true state is revealed. In some ways this discourages
households from entering the market, specially those with bad projects (as
the b-types). However, in presence of corruption, the households can bribe
the inspector and end up paying a smaller amount.
It is clear that household￿ s expected income from entrepreneurial activity
will depend on the cost of evading T and the cost of borrowing K. De-
pending on whether the household incurs the legitimate cost T or not, the
jth-household of type-i will undertake production if and only if
Vij = ￿i:(Y ￿ ri:K) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿i):wi ￿ T ￿ V 0
ij; (3)
or
Vij = ￿i:f(Y ￿ ri:K) ￿ Xi)g ￿ (1 ￿ ￿i):wi ￿ V 0
ij; (4)
11where Vij represent the expected income of the jth-household within type-i;
Xi is the expected cost (which includes bribes, ￿nes) and V 0
ij is the outside
option available to the jth-household of type-i. Note when households
undertakes production activities Vij = Vi, 8j 2 i.
We assume that V 0
ij 2 [V ;V ] and all types have the same uniform distri-
bution over [V ;V ]. So Vi will determine what fraction of the household of
type-i will undertake production.
2.5 The Game
After production has been undertaken, depending on the realization of Y ,
the ￿rm makes a report of its income. The failure state can be viewed
as a bankruptcy state and can always be veri￿ed. If the ￿rm declares
bankruptcy, the bank will verify the state and claim the value of collaterals
wi. As is standard in the literature, we assume that a ￿rm will never declare
bankruptcy with positive output. In the successful state, the ￿rm makes
the due repayment ri:K to the bank.
Before we begin the analysis it will be useful to summarize the sequence
of moves in the model.
1. Nature chooses the di⁄erent types of the household. The households
decide whether to undertake entrepreneurial activity or not. This decision
is denoted by a 2 f0;1g, where a = 1 refers to production activity.
2. The bank o⁄ers a contract or a menu of contracts to the households
(or ￿rms) (ri;wi).
3. The ￿rms choose particular contracts.
4. Firms choose l 2 f0;1g, where l = 1 refers to ￿rm￿ s decision to incur
the cost T (and not engage in corruption). Inspection is carried out by the
inspectors. Corrupt inspectors can collude with the ￿rm. Once the output
is realized, ￿rm repays the bank according to the agreed contract.
5. Following the inspector￿ s report, all bribes or ￿nes are paid.
12For convenience, we shall label stages 2-3 as the credit market game
and stages 4-5 as the bribe game. Clearly, the outcome in the bribe game
will determine the outcome in the credit market. We shall be looking at
equilibria satisfying backward induction.
De￿nition 1 An equilibrium is de￿ned as a tuple faij; li;(ri;wi)g such that
given households￿decision, the credit market is in equilibrium and given the
credit contracts (ri;wi) each household￿ s decision is optimal.
An equilibrium in the game stages 2-5 will induce a unique outcome
on household￿ s entry decisions. Household￿ s choice of a depends on the
expected payo⁄ Vij from production and the outside option V 0
ij: Note that
within each type, households di⁄er only in terms of their outside option V 0
ij.
Therefore when it comes to the decision to enter or not, households within
each type may behave di⁄erently, whereas when it comes to the credit market
and the bribe amount they will behave identically. To distinguish this fact,
in the equilibrium, we have an extra subscript j for the entry variable a.
We shall ￿nd it convenient to describe household￿ s choice to enter, by the
participation rate of each type of household ￿ denoted by ￿i. It represents
the fraction of households of type-i entering production sector. Let Ni
be the number of i-type households, then given ￿i, we can calculate the
distribution of di⁄erent types in the credit market as ￿i = (Ni￿i)=
P
Ni￿i
where i = g; b; p.
Notice that both the total number of ￿rms entering production and the
number of ￿rms choosing evasion and bribery will be determined in equi-
librium. In that sense, both corruption and competition are endogenously
determined. In addition, we have two model parameters q and ￿b which
describe the scope of corruption and the degree of competitive pressures
in the economy respectively. Our comparative statics exercises will be in
relation to these two parameters.
133 Results and Analysis
3.1 Tax and Bribe
Suppose the ￿rm decides not to incur the cost T, it can be inspected by
an inspector with some probability ￿. We shall assume that to discourage
such non-compliance the ￿rm has to pay a ￿ne F, where F ￿ T. However,
a corrupt inspector can always collude with the ￿rm and not report the
non-compliance in exchange for a bribe. The bribe amount obviously will
depend on the relative bargaining powers, we shall simply assume it to be
￿F, where ￿ < 1. This can be interpreted as the outcome of a game where
the inspector makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal with probability ￿ and the
￿rm can accept or reject. The ￿rm makes a similar o⁄er with probability
(1 ￿ ￿). If accepted, the ￿rm is not reported. We also assume limited
liability which implies that ￿nes can not be collected from non-successful
￿rms and for successful ￿rms F ￿ Y ￿ riK. Hence a ￿rm will choose l = 0
if and only if
￿i:￿(qF + (1 ￿ q)￿F) ￿ T (5)
which implies,
￿i ￿ ￿(￿;T;q;F) = ￿: (6)
Remark 1 There is a critical success rate ￿, such that all ￿rms with ￿i ￿ ￿
will engage in corruption.
This is a direct implication of the ￿xed ￿ne and limited liabilities. Al-
ternatively, we could take this ￿ne to be complete or partial loss of net pro￿t
of the ￿rm. In such a case, Fi = (Y ￿ riK): Suppose this could be inter-
preted as a situation where a ￿rm ceases to operate once its illegal behavior
is detected. In that case only ￿rms with lower expected pro￿tability are
likely to take the risk of being illegal. This argument has been used in
14the literature in the context of e¢ ciency wage of the tax inspectors. An
inspector is not likely to engage in bribery if the wages are high, because
the inspector would not like to loose this high future stream of wage income
for the present bribe. In our case it is the prospect of future pro￿tability
(not explicitly modelled) which determines a ￿rm￿ s willingness to engage in
illegal behavior.
Using the same bargaining framework, it is easy to see that the bribe
will be ￿(Y ￿ riK). Denoting (Y ￿ riK) as Zi, a ￿rm will choose l = 0 if
and only if
￿iZi ￿ T < ￿i [(1 ￿ ￿)Zi + ￿q(1 ￿ ￿)Zi];
from which it follows that,
￿i <
T
￿(1 ￿ q(1 ￿ ￿)):Zi
= ￿i: (7)
Although this is similar to the inequality in (6), but unlike the ￿xed penalty
case, ￿ is now type speci￿c. This is because it now depends on Zi, which
in turn will depend on the credit market outcome. From (7) it is clear
that for a given ￿i, a high ri and consequently a lower Zi, will increase the
possibility that a type will be corrupt. In the next section we discuss how
the ri is determined both under complete and incomplete information in the
credit market.
Notice that as q, which measures the scope of corruption, rises, ￿i also
rises and more ￿rm types would be encouraged to choose l = 0:14
14Note that all ￿rm within a type choose l in the same way irrespective of their wealth
or outside option. One can address the ￿rm speci￿c choice but it complicates the analysis
considerably.
153.2 Credit Market
In this sub-section we discuss the credit market game. First we consider a
benchmark case where there are no imperfections in the credit market. We
show that when the banks can identify the di⁄erent types (good or bad)
of households, wealth inequality among the households does not matter.
Wealth here is mainly in terms of collateralizable assets. Wealth inequality
leads to a situation where some households can put up collateral and others
cannot. The level of wealth does not a⁄ect a household￿ s need to borrow
K or income streams Y .15
3.2.1 Complete Information Benchmark
Note that under complete information, there is no need for collateral. This
is a direct implication of the collateral cost. This can be seen in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1.]
Figure 1 shows the iso-pro￿t curves and indi⁄erence curves (Vi) of the
di⁄erent types of households in the r ￿ w plane. Given that ￿b < ￿g, the
b-type high risk households have a steeper indi⁄erence curve. The dotted
lines show the zero pro￿t lines for the bank. Notice that there is a cost
associated with the collateral. This means that the banks will prefer not to
have collateral to cover their loans completely. It can be checked that the
slopes (absolute values) of the indi⁄erence curves and the iso-pro￿t curve
are given by
15A natural interpretation of this wealth would be various assets which can not be
subsititued directly for capital in the production process but households could borrow
money against these. For instance, it is unlikely that one with more land would need less


















Since 1 > ￿ > 0; the household￿ s indi⁄erence curve is steeper than the
banks indi⁄erence curve. Under complete information, points D and E, in
Figure 1, are the equilibrium contracts. Firms with a good projects will be
o⁄ered contract E and ￿rms with a bad projects will be o⁄ered D. The
g-type ￿rms will pay a lower interest rate where as the high risk b-type ￿rms
will pay a higher interest rate. Note that this situation will not change if
there is wealth inequality. Since there is no collateral use in equilibrium,
the wealth constrained p-type ￿rms (who di⁄ers from the g-types only in




b denote the corresponding interest factors. The superscript
c denote the outcome under complete information. The net income Zc
i of





p. Hence, from (7), one can show that for the bribe market,
the critical success rates of the b-types are higher than the g-types, that is,
￿c
g < ￿c
b. Therefore, if ￿g < ￿c
g, all ￿rms choose the illegal course of action.
On the other hand if ￿c
b < ￿b then none of ￿rms will be corrupt. Although
such extreme cases may be plausible, our focus is on the in between scenario
where only the b-types engage in corruption, which will be the case if,
￿b < ￿c
g < ￿c
b < ￿g: (9)
However, this does not guarantee that corruption will take place in equi-
librium. That depends on whether the b-types will enter production in the
17￿rst place, that is, whether
V c
b = maxf￿b(Zc
b) ￿ T; ￿b(Zc
b ￿ Xc
b)g > V , (10)
where Xc
b = (1 ￿ ￿)Zc
b + ￿q(1 ￿ ￿)Zc
b. Similarly, g-types enter whenever
V c
g = ￿g(Zc
g) ￿ T > V : (11)
We shall assume that V < V c
g , so that some g-types always enter. The



















where ￿V = V ￿ V . This completes the description of the equilibrium
under complete information. It is clear that wealth inequality does not
play any role but even in this simple setting we can see the relation between
competition and corruption.
Suppose V c
b = V and ￿c
b > ￿b, then a rise in the number of corrupt
inspectors would facilitate entry by the b-types by reducing Xc
b. The number
of bribe paying ￿rms will rise as the b-types are going to avoid T. Here
the entry of b-type ￿rms has no e⁄ect on the entry or exit decisions of the
g-type or p-type ￿rms. Hence, along with corruption, the total number of
￿rms, which re￿ ects competition, will increase.
We can interpret ￿b as a measure of competitiveness of the market.16 In
a competitive market without any friction only the most e¢ cient ￿rms are
likely to succeed. In our case since the b-type ￿rms are ine¢ cient, a lower
chance of success can be viewed as an increase in competitiveness. A fall
in ￿b can have mixed results. De￿ne ￿0 as the level of competitiveness so
16In our framework, ￿ depends on both the level of e¢ ciency and the level of compet-
itiveness. More precisely, at higher levels of e¢ ciency, increase in competitiveness has
negligient e⁄ect on ￿, but for lower levels of e¢ ciency, competitiveness reduces ￿.
18that there is no-entry by the b-type; V c
b = V . Now consider the case where
the market forces are not that competitive (re￿ ected in ￿b > ￿0), but the
b-types are not corrupt, that is, ￿b > ￿c
b. A fall in ￿b will reduce entry by
the b-types but for those entering the market it can induce them to choose
the illegitimate mode if the second inequality is reversed i.e. ￿0 < ￿b <
￿c
b. Hence competitive pressures can drive these ￿rms towards corruption.
However, a substantial reduction in ￿b can eliminate both entry of ine¢ cient
￿rms and corruption, if ￿b is less than ￿0. It is clear that with a greater
scope of corruption (q), the required level of competition has to be greater
(lower ￿0). As we shall see in the next section, it also depends on the extent
of credit market imperfections.
We can summarize these in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the complete information case, wealth inequality does not
matter and 1 ￿ ￿c
g = ￿c
p > ￿c
b ￿ 0. Corruption facilitates the entry of b-
types without any distorting e⁄ects on the g-types. Rise in competitiveness
can lead to greater corruption if it does not succeed in preventing entry by
b-type ￿rms.
3.2.2 Incomplete Information and Wealth Inequality
Next, we study the case where the banks can not identify the di⁄erent types.
Banks, however, have (common) belief about the distribution of the three
types. The treatment of the credit market is standard except that (i) there
are some p-type households who are wealth constrained and hence cannot
put up any collateral and (ii) the distribution of di⁄erent types in the credit
market is not exogenously given.
Since the banker cannot a priori distinguish between the di⁄erent types,
the banker uses the two instruments, r and w, at his disposal to screen
the di⁄erent types.17 It is clear that the complete information pair D and
17See Bester (1985) for an early model of screening with collateral.
19E would not be incentive compatible because the b-type could always get
a higher payo⁄ by choosing E. Due to the presence of p-type ￿rms the
standard screening outcome of the credit market, where the di⁄erent types
are completely separated, is not feasible. This is because in any separating
outcome, the g-type will have to put up some collateral, but since the p-
types18 are collateral constrained, the bank is forced to o⁄er them a contract
with no collateral. In that case, it is easy for the high risk b-types to act as
the p-types. Similarly, it is easy to show that a pooling outcome is also not
possible. In Figure 1 the pooled contract satisfying the zero pro￿t condition
is given by G. Drawing the Vb, Vg passing through point G, it can be seen
that a bank can always o⁄er a contract like point F. The b-types will not
choose but the g-types will prefer to choose F. Since this point lies above
the zero pro￿t line for the g-types, the bank can earn positive pro￿t by
o⁄ering such a contract. Hence G can not be the equilibrium outcome.
However, as seen in Figure 2, a semi-separating equilibrium is possible,




g) and (r￿;0) (represented by B and A respectively),
is o⁄ered. The g-types chooses contract B and the p and b-types pool at
A. Note that the b-types have no incentive to deviate from A to B: The
p-types cannot deviate to any contract with w > 0. Moreover, the g-types
also have no incentive to deviate to A: Using superscript s to denote the
outcome under semi-separating equilibrium under incomplete information,
let V s
i represent the expected income of type-i. From these expected payo⁄s
we can ￿nd the participation rates ￿s
i = (V s
i ￿ V0)=￿V . The probability
that a borrower belongs to type-i household undertaking entrepreneurial
18Recall the p-types are the same as the g-types, except that they cannot put forth any
collateral.








The semi-separating contract pair, (r￿
g;w￿
g) and (r￿;0), will indeed be an
equilibrium if a bank can not deviate and o⁄er a pooled contract fetching
non-negative pro￿t. Such deviations can be ruled out if the pooled interest
rate G lies above the point H, since in that case the g-types will not prefer
the pooled contract. We broadly characterize the result below.
Let r be the interest rate where all three types are pooled and the bank￿ s
zero pro￿t condition is met (point G). It is given by the following
r =
￿0 ￿




Likewise, under the semi-separating equilibrium the pooled interest rate





where ￿i represents the proportion of type-i engaged in production and
accepting the pooled contract under the semi-separating equilibrium; ￿i =
￿i=(￿b+￿p); i = b; p. Comparing (14) and (15), it is easy to see that r￿ > r.
De￿ne r0 as the interest rate such that the g-types are indi⁄erent between
the equilibrium contract (r￿
g;w￿
g) and (r0;0) (point H), that is,
￿g(Y ￿ r￿
gK) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿g)w￿
g = ￿g(Y ￿ r0K): (16)
Moreover, (r￿
g;w￿








21and the zero pro￿t condition of the bank,
￿gr￿
gK + (1 ￿ ￿g)￿w￿
g = ￿0. (18)
The equilibrium requirement (G lying above H) is reduced to r0 < r.
This condition will depend on various model parameters ￿i, Ni and ￿. In-
tuitively, if Ng is not too large relative to Nb and Np; and ￿b is not too small,
r0 < r will be satis￿ed. Suppose, there are very few b-type households and
their success probability is also very low, then one would expect very few of
them in the credit market. On the other hand if there are many g-types in
the credit market the pooled interest rate will be lower and closer to the
complete information interest rate for the g-types. Given that screening is
costly, the g-types would prefer the pooling outcome.19
It is easy to compare the semi-separating outcome with the complete
information case; V s
p < V c
p , V s
b > V c
b and V s
g < V c
g . However, note that
V c
p ￿ V s
p > V c
g ￿ V s
g . In other words, the loss in income is much higher for
the p-types compared to the g-types. More b-types will enter the market







If we have V s
g > V ; V s
p > V then despite the fall in expected payo⁄, the








p. For the p-types since Zs
p < Zc




g. Although in the complete information case the p-types
were not paying any bribes, now there is a possibility they might do so if,
￿s
p > ￿p > ￿c
p. The situation will be similar for the g-types; they may
engage in corruption in this situation, if ￿s
g > ￿g > ￿c
g. These conditions,
however, will fail to hold in presence of (9), which is ￿b < ￿c
g < ￿c
b < ￿g.
19Since the distribution of types itself is equilibrium determined (through ￿), the ana-
lytical conditions are very messy. We have chosen to present a numerical example (later
in this section) to show the equilibrium construct and its properties.
22This is because the lowest possible income is earned by the b-types under
complete information, that is Zc
b < Zs
p < Zs








in our framework the p-types and the g-types do not engage in corruption
under the incomplete information scenario.
For the b-types, Zs
b > Zc
b implies that ￿s
b < ￿c
b. Hence there could arise
a possibility that b-types do not engage in corruption if ￿s
b < ￿b < ￿c
b. As
before, this case can be ruled out since (9) holds. We know that since
the g-types income under the complete information scenario is the highest
possible income, which implies Zc
g > Zs
b. Hence it must be the case that
￿s
b > ￿c
g > ￿b. Therefore the b-types will continue to choose l = 0.
Since more b-types enter the market the number of ￿rms in equilibrium
opting for the illegal route, and as a consequence bribery, will rise. This
would imply that the level of corruption as measured by the ratio of corrupt
￿rms to the total number of ￿rms could be higher. We summarize the
previous discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under incomplete information and wealth inequality, there
exists a semi-separating screening equilibrium [fr￿
g;w￿
gg;fr￿;0g] where the b
and p types pool at r￿and g type separates at fr￿
g;w￿







p. In addition, if ￿b < ￿c
g < ￿c
b < ￿g, a larger fraction of
the total ￿rms in the market will engage in bribery.
An Example. Consider an economy with a large number of b-types.
Nb = 6000; Np = 1200; Ng = 517. Let K = 20; ￿0 = 20; ￿ = 1=2; ￿b = 1=4;
￿g = 1=2; Y = 200; T = 20: For the bribe game, let ￿ = q = 1=2; ￿ = 1=3
and F = 120. For simplicity we are considering the ￿xed penalty case
(see (6)). Using (6) it is clear that ￿ = 1=2, hence only b-types will ￿nd
it pro￿table to evade T. The expected payments (bribe with probability
￿q and ￿ne F with probability ￿(1 ￿ q) = X) is 40. Recall that these
23payments are made only in the successful state. The support of the outside
options is given by V = 20; V = 60: For the complete information case,
using (1), (10), and (11) it is easy to check that rc
g = 2; rc
b = 4 and V c
g = 60;
V c




b = 0. Hence, despite the presence of corruption prone ￿rms there
will be no corruption in equilibrium.
Now consider the semi-separating outcome. It is given by r￿
g = 28=15;
w￿
g = 16=3 and r￿ = 8=3: This leads to ￿s
g = (5:8=6); ￿s
p = 5=6 and ￿s
b = 1=6:
As expected, the p-type￿ s participation rate falls by 1=6. Using (15)-(18),
it can be checked that this constitutes an equilibrium. From (13), the
participation rates imply the following distribution of types ￿p = ￿b = 2=5
and ￿g = 1=5. The zero pro￿t condition (2), and (18) for the banks is
satis￿ed. If a bank were to deviate and o⁄er a completely pooled contract
(while still earning zero pro￿t), the corresponding interest factor (as in 14)
will be 5=2: However, at this interest factor, the g-types earn an expected
payo⁄ of 55 which is lower than their equilibrium payo⁄ of 58:66. Hence
such a deviation will not be successful. In this equilibrium, 40 percent of
the ￿rms will be engaging in evasion and bribery. Therefore, compared to
the complete information case, there is an increase in corrupt activities.
3.2.3 Changes in Inequality
Consider a redistribution of wealth where wealth inequality increases such
that Nb stays the same, Ng falls and Np rises. The pooled interest rate
in the semi-separating equilibrium will fall (as Np increases). At the pre-
redistribution participation rates, rise in Np will lead to a rise in ￿p and fall
in ￿b. Since ￿g > ￿b, it is clear that (using (15)) r￿ will fall. Consequently,
fr￿
g;w￿
gg will also change. Following a fall in r￿ payo⁄s to all the three types
24(V s
g ; V s
p ; V s
b ) will rise. It can be veri￿ed that
dV s
b
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So participation rates will increase for all types. However, as we explain
in the following paragraph, the post-distribution participation rate of the
p-types will always be lower than the pre-distribution participation rates.
Hence some of the erstwhile g-type will exit the market as a result of this
distribution. The rise in V s
b leads to more b-type households in the market.
The rise in ￿b will in fact be the equilibrating force as this would lead to a
rise in ￿b and arrest the fall in the pooled interest rate.
The e⁄ect on the market outcome depends on the pre-distribution par-
ticipation rates. Suppose, prior to redistribution, ￿s
g = 1; ￿s
p = 1 and
￿s
b > 0. In such case, there will be no change in the participation rates
of entrepreneurs with good projects and only the number of bad projects
increases in equilibrium. The result will be an increase in the total number
of ￿rms in the production sector and a rise in the number of corrupt ￿rms.




b > 0. Let ￿0 denote the participation rates in the new
equilibrium and N0 be the post-distribution numbers of di⁄erent households
in the economy. Let Ng ￿ N0
g = N0
p ￿ Np = ￿n. The change in the total










25It can be shown that ￿s
g ￿ ￿0
p > 0: Suppose it is not true, then it follows
that for the new pooled rate (for p and b types) A shifts down and lies
below G in Figure 2. But this implies the existence of a common pooled
interest rate with all g-types that lies below G. This, however, violates
the initial equilibrium condition that no bank can o⁄er a pooled rate and
attract the g-types. Since the ￿rst two terms are positive, the total number
of good projects will be reduced if the third term dominates the ￿rst two
terms. From (20) it is clear that (￿0
g ￿ ￿s
g) is always likely to be small.
Hence, a large (￿s
g ￿ ￿0
p) would lead to ￿ng < 0. The di⁄erence between
the participation rates of the g-types and the wealth constrained p-types is
likely to be higher if there are too many b-types in the market. With more
b-types in the market, the distance AH (in Figure 2) is also greater implying
a higher value for (V s
g ￿V s
p ). Hence if we start from a situation where there
are lot of bad projects and the fraction of wealth constrained households
with good projects is not very large, the rise in inequality leads to a fall
in the number of good projects. However, the number of bad projects can
never go down. Following the previous discussion we can state the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 As the fraction of poor households increases following a rise
in wealth inequality, more b-type ￿rms enter the production sector and some
g-type ￿rms leave.
If ￿b < ￿c
g < ￿c
b < ￿g; the number of ￿rms engaging in evasion and
bribery will also be higher. This matches well with our earlier observation
in section 1 that a rise in inequality is associated with greater incidence of
corruption.20 However, note that the adverse e⁄ects of this rise in inequality
have greater bite when there are more b-types in the market. This is
where the environmental parameter q (fraction of corruptible inspectors)
20Banerjee (1997) models inequality in a similar manner and obtains a similar result in
a di⁄erent context.
26comes into play. As discussed earlier, a high value of q induces greater
participation by the b-types. Hence inequality matters more in a corruption
prone environment.
It must be pointed out that not all forms of redistributions will lead
to similar outcome. We are considering redistribution amongst households
with same project types. Recall that the p-types are essentially wealth
constrained g-types, hence the redistribution discussed in the previous para-
graph refers to a redistribution within the households with good projects.
By introducing another type ￿ wealth constrained b-types (say pb) ￿ we
can consider similar redistribution within the b-types. But it is not going to
a⁄ect the equilibrium outcome in any signi￿cant manner. Hence following
any such redistribution Nb and (Ng +Np) stay the same. This means that
any redistribution that leaves the number of wealth constrained households,
Np, una⁄ected will not have any impact on the market outcome. We can
allow for redistribution of wealth across the di⁄erent types without a⁄ecting
the total number of good and bad projects. For example, if we transfer
some wealth from the rich households with bad projects to the wealth con-
strained households with good projects, the end result will be a fall in Np
and a rise in Ng without a⁄ecting Nb. This will have exactly the same e⁄ect
as a reduction in inequality of the type of redistribution (from rich g-type
to the p-type) that we discussed earlier.
3.2.4 Competition and Corruption
The b-type households bene￿t in two ways ￿ their cost of funds is subsidized
by the other households to some extent and they also manage to increase
pro￿tability by avoiding T. We can re-examine the level of competitiveness
that can eliminate corruption. Since V s
b > V c
b ; the level of competitive
pressures ￿0 at which the b-types do not enter at all is much lower in the
semi-separating equilibrium case. Higher the level of inequality (fraction of
27p-type) lower will be the pooled interest rate and higher will be the payo⁄
to the b-type, V s
b , resulting in a lower ￿0. This means that competitive
pressures have to be of the highest order to eliminate entry by these ine¢ -
cient ￿rms and hence corruption. There is now a bigger range in which b-
type ￿rms enter the market and engage in bribery.
On the other hand, the presence of a corrupt environment now a⁄ects the
market outcome in a di⁄erent way. Unlike the complete information case,
corruption not only a⁄ects the b-type ￿rms, it also a⁄ects the incentives of
the p-type and g-type ￿rms as well. A high value of q facilitates entry by
more b-type ￿rms and leads to a rise in the pooled interest rate r￿. The
resulting fall in V s
p ; V s
g leads to lower participation by the p-type and g-
type ￿rms. The total number of ￿rms of course will depend on the relative
strengths of these two e⁄ects.
Hence, to summarize, in the presence of credit market imperfections the
level of competitiveness required to eliminate corruption is always higher
and the households with good projects are adversely a⁄ected by a rise in
the scope of corruption.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed how wealth inequality may lead to increased cor-
ruption in an economy characterized by free entry conditions. This is made
possible by the presence of ine¢ cient ￿rms who can not be prevented from
the entering production due to imperfections in related markets. As more
and more ine¢ cient ￿rms enter the market, the total number of ￿rms might
rise but corruption also rises. Corruption has a distorting role; it encour-
ages entry by ine¢ cient ￿rms and can lead to exit by some e¢ cient ￿rms.
As we have shown (Propositions 1 and 2) this is feasible because of wealth
inequality and incomplete information in the credit market. In fact such
imperfections play a signi￿cant role in determining the evolution of corrup-
28tion and competition. It also highlights how greater competition coexists
with greater corruption in a market free from pre-liberalization controls.
The multi-market orientation of our model can lead to a somewhat dif-
ferent focus so far as policy implications are concerned. It shows that policy
intervention crucially depends on the nature of outcomes in the other mar-
ket. Policy intervention in the credit market, for example, will depend on
the extent of corruption. In some cases, corruption makes it di¢ cult to
implement other policies aimed at addressing the credit market problems
arising out of inequality. Likewise, anti-corruption policies have to be eval-
uated in the light of the credit market outcomes. In general, anti-corruption
policy analysis takes a partial equilibrium approach and focuses on the same
market where corruption takes place. In the present case that would mean
raising inspection probability (￿) or ￿ne (F); and create incentive for the
inspectors to reduce q. Our paper, complementary to this approach, would
point also in the direction of the credit market. As seen in our numeri-
cal example, elimination of imperfections in the credit market can eliminate
corruption by preventing the entry of the corruption prone ￿rms. This,
we consider, is an important point to bear in mind while designing policies
especially in developing countries where more than one market exhibit var-
ious kinds of imperfections. This view in a wider context is not new, but is
worth emphasizing in the context of corruption.
We have not modelled competition in an explicit way, but it is clear that
competition in the sense of the number of ￿rms in the production sector is
being determined endogenously. However, as has been rightly pointed by
Bliss and di Tella (1997), one would need to go beyond the simple measure
of the number of ￿rms to capture competition. Moreover, for comparative
static exercises we have to look at other deeper parameters of competition.
Unfortunately, apart from the success probabilities of the di⁄erent types
we do not have any parameters which can capture the degree of competi-
29tion. It is possible to overcome this by modelling the interaction between
the e¢ cient (g-type) and ine¢ cient (b-type) ￿rms in the product market.21
However, given the multi-market nature of our model, the analysis gets quite
complicated and we have chosen not to pursue this line.
Similar issues arise in our treatment of corruption. A ￿rm￿ s incentive to
engage in illegal evasion and bribery is determined to a large extent by its
own type description (￿i) and structural parameter including the fraction of
corruptible inspectors (q). In fact, for the ￿xed penalty case (given by (6)),
the level of corruption is completely determined by these parameters. It is
possible to address this by endogenizing q to some extent. For example, as
the prospect of bribe income goes up (due to more evading ￿rms or higher
bribe), one would expect q to go up. This, in turn, will a⁄ect bribe decisions
of other ￿rms in the market.
Wealth inequality and corruption are related in another important way.
It is possible that wealthier households would spend more resources into
buying power and access to politicians and bureaucrats.22 One can model
a situation where the household, in addition to choosing whether to produce
or not, also chooses how much to invest (monetary as well as non monetary
resources such as e⁄ort) in buying access. This would be similar to the
case where ￿rms spend money on campaign contributions, buy contacts
and spend e⁄ort in building a political and bureaucratic network. A ￿rm
with access can evade taxes with a higher probability. This ex-ante choice
of investment in access buying can replace the current framework where
they bribe later. This way we can derive household￿ s investment in access
buying as a function of household wealth and the type of the project. Such a
framework can be used to examine whether corruption makes the persistence
21Straub (2004) analyzes the relation between corruption and competition in a model
where ￿rms compete in a Cournot or Betrand fashion.
22Do (2004) analyzes how coaltions of wealthy individuals would bribe the regulator for
retaining sole access to production activities. This could, in turn, lead to persistence of
wealth inequality as the less wealthy are left out of the production sector.
30of inequality more likely in the long run. We leave that for future work.
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35A Appendix
Mean Std dev Min Max Obs
Proportion of corrupt ￿rms 0.38 0.16 0.138 0.738 23
Number of ￿rms 147.95 88.75 86 532 23
GDP per capita (1999) 2407.55 2132.87 267.02 9257.41 23
Lagged Gini 34.67 7.47 21.7 50.3 23
Table 1a: Summary Statistics
Proportion of Number GDP per Lagged
corrupt ￿rms of ￿rms capita1 Gini
Proportion of corrupt ￿rms 1
Number of ￿rms -0.003 1
GDP per capita1 -0.764￿ -0.088 1
Lagged Gini 0.699￿ 0.023 -0.567￿ 1
Table 1b: The correlation matrix
￿Signi￿cant at 1%. 1: GDP per capita 1999 (constant 2000 US$)
36Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coe¢ cients
Number of ￿rms -0.0005 -0.0000b -0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Gini index 0.0678￿￿ 0.0338￿
(0.0164) (0.0178)
GDP per capita -0.0003￿￿ -0.0002￿￿
(0.0000)a (0.0000)c
Constant 0.2319 -2.8557￿￿ -0.6152
(0.2173) (0.5513) (0.4244)
R2 0.6284 0.4625 0.7065
F-statistics 12.88￿￿ 8.79￿￿ 16.91￿￿
Observations 23 23 23
Table 2: Regression on log of the odds ratio
The numbers in the brackets are the (robust) standard errors.
￿ Shows signi￿cance at 5% level. ￿￿ Shows signi￿cance at 1% level.
a: The actual value is 0.00005. b: The actual value is -0.000009.
c: The actual value is 0.00005
37Countries Proportion of Number of GDP per Lagged
Corrupt ￿rms1 ￿rms1 capita 1999￿2 Gini3
Armenia 0.488 125 573.59 37.90a
Azerbaijan 0.738 130 594.49 46.20a
Belarus 0.244 123 1199.66 21.70a
Bulgaria 0.393 117 1457.25 34.50a
Croatia 0.261 119 3937.46 29.00a
Czech Republic 0.167 126 5215.32 26.15b
Estonia 0.152 125 3681.59 37.60a
Georgia 0.467 120 565.09 50.30a
Hungary 0.210 138 4405.72 24.40a
Kazakhstan 0.386 127 1089.68 35.40b
Kyrgyzstan 0.689 122 267.03 41.10a
Latvia 0.303 155 3026.66 32.40a
Lithuania 0.453 86 3101.77 32.87a
Macedonia 0.442 113 1700.94 28.20a
Moldova 0.442 129 294.35 42.60a
Poland 0.287 209 4144.50 31.60a
Romania 0.458 107 1640.02 31.10a
Russia 0.383 532 1613.70 34.60a
Slovakia 0.295 112 3672.74 26.20a
Slovenia 0.138 116 9257.41 28.40a
Turkey 0.412 136 2799.82 41.50c
Ukraine 0.555 220 591.51 39.10a
Uzbekistan 0.578 116 543.30 44.60a
Table 3: Data
Subscript indicates data year a: 1998; b: 1996; c: 1994. ￿Constant 2000 US$.
Source: 1: BEEPS (World Bank 1999); 2: World Development Indicators
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